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INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF INTRA-FAMILY
USE OF TRANSFER-LEASEBACKS, PRIVATE
ANNUITIES AND INSTALLMENT SALES
By BARBARA B. HIPPLE
I have been asked to speak today on the general subject of transferring
property between family members through the use of private annuities,
installment sales, or transfers followed by leasebacks, any one of which
might be chosen by the transferor in hopes of obtaining income tax
advantages. Obviously, any transfer of property between family members, whether by one of these or by some other method, cannot be
undertaken without considering the whole panoply of taxes; estate tax
and gift tax as well as income tax. Consequently, the entire, complex
interrelationship between income, estate and gift tax consequences to
both the transferor and the transferee must be traced before choosing
to avail oneself of any of these methods of transfer. Therefore, while
my focus today is on the current income tax developments in the use
of these three different transfer methods, the estate and gift tax consequences of all of them will also be considered in order to keep the
usefulness and drawbacks of each of these devices in proper perspective.
Although transfers between family members may occur for a variety
of reasons and can involve all kinds of property, I would like to focus
my discussion on a hypothetical typical of one of the more common
situations in which these methods of transfer could be considered for use.
The hypothetical has the following basic facts:
The taxpayer, age 67, is the sole proprietor of a small
but successful business, worth approximately $1 million. His
total investment in this business, net of depreciation, is
$250,000 which leaves him with a net potential gain of
$750,000. The single most valuable business asset is the
land, improved by a building in which the business is conducted. He purchased the property some years ago for
$100,000. Due to its prime central location, it is now worth
approximately $700,000. This taxpayer is interested in retiring, and has two sons, willing to take over the business but
unable to purchase the business directly because of their own
limited financial resources. The taxpayer does not want to
pay any income tax on the potential gain from either the
sale of the business or the land and building if he can avoid
it, but he is also not particularly interested in paying any
gift tax on the property and, of course, he would also like
to avoid any estate taxes at death.
Although this hypothetical is dramatically oversimplified from the
planning perspective, it is realistic to the extent that the taxpayer would
like to find some way to transfer the property to his two sons without
a reduction in income after the transfer, to avoid all income tax as
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a result of the transfer, to avoid any gift tax on the transfer, and to
have nothing left in his estate on which estate tax can be assessed
when he dies. Now, let's consider the three different transfer methods
to see how close we can come to satisfying these obviously impossible
goals.
We will consider first the private annuity transaction. By way of introduction, let me briefly review how the basic annuity rules work. Section
72 of the Internal Revenue Code deals generally with the tax consequences of an annuity. Even though the Code and Regulations do
not define an annuity in precise terms, it has long been recognized that a
private arrangement between individuals can constitute an annuity within
the meaning of Section 72 just as the more traditional commercial annuity is subject to Section 72. The approach of Section 72 is to permit
the person who receives the annuity (the taxpayer in the hypothetical),
to recover his investment in the annuity contract on a ratable basis over
the period of the annuity payments. Of course, this is done on the basis
of the calculation of an exclusion ratio, which is the "investment in the
contract" divided by the estimated return to the annuitant over the life
of the annuity. This exclusion ratio is then applied to each annuity
payment received by the annuitant during his life, or the term of years
if that is what he bargained for. If the annuitant has a life annuity, the
exclusion ratio is applied to each payment regardless of whether he
actually lives for a period which is longer or shorter than his life
expectancy as calculated in the actuarial tables used to determine the
expected return on the contract.
If an individual were to take a substantial amount of cash and
transfer it to another family member in return for an annuity which
has a present value equal to the cash transferred, the transaction might
appear to have been neutral for both estate and gift tax purposes. The
transferor merely replaced one asset, the cash, with another equally valuable asset, the annuity promise. This conclusion, however, is, not
completely accurate. When the transferor dies after the purchase of
the annuity, Section 2039, which deals with the inclusion of annuities
in the gross estate of a decedent, would provide that nothing be included
in the taxpayer's estate as a result of his right to receive the life annuity
payments if he was the only annuitant, although if he had died owning
the cash, it would be included in his estate under Section 2033. Also,
to the extent that the annuity payments themselves were expended by the
transferor for his living expenses, the effect of the transaction would be
to remove the original asset from the transferor's estate at no gift tax
cost, and to replace it with a "wasting" asset, that is, one which was
not included in the estate for estate tax purposes and was used by the
transferor during life, as, and to the extent, he received payments. Furthermore, if the value of the right to receive annuity payments at the time
of the transfer equalled or exceeded the value of the property trans-
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ferred, the transferor would not have made a gift, so there would be
no gift tax due.
Given these substantial potential estate and gift tax benefits, surely
there must be an income tax drawback which tends to limit use of this
kind of transaction. Surprisingly enough there is no major income tax
disadvantage, because the property used to purchase the private annuity
would represent the investment in the contract and could be recovered
by the transferor tax-free. In effect, the only income tax cost would
be the income tax, at the transferor's marginal tax rates, on the taxable
portion of each annuity payment. What may prevent to some degree the
more widespread use of this device is not the prospect of adverse income
tax consequences, but rather the practical problem of having one family
member dependent upon receiving payments from another family member for a long and somewhat unpredictable period of time, as would
be the case with a life annuity.
Another deterrent to widespread use of the family annuity is the
slightly more complex problem which arises when the transferor uses
appreciated property to purchase an unsecured private annuity, such
as our hypothetical taxpayer's transfer of the business itself, or the
major asset of the business. If we assume that our taxpayer transfers
the business itself in return for a promised annuity of $100,000 a year
from his two sons, what income tax consequences can be anticipated?
Unfortunately, the answer to that question is not completely clear. The
taxpayer has transferred an asset, worth $1 million, in which he had
an original investment of only $250,000, in return for a private annuity
promise of $100,000 a year, which, under the tables provided in Treasury Regulations Section 20.2031-10(f), has a value of $757,630. The
Service has attempted to resolve all the income, estate and gift tax consequences which follow from this transaction in Revenue Ruling 69-74.
Applying that Ruling to the facts of our hypothetical would dictate the
following results:
(1) Because the $1 million value of the property transferred exceeds
the present fair market value of the annuity promise, ($757,630),
a gift of $242,370 has been made to the transferees at the time of the
annuity purchase.
(2) The taxpayer's "investment in the contract", for purposes of
determining the exclusion ratio under Section 72, is the basis of the
property transferred, or in our hypothetical, $250,000 rather than the
$1 million fair market value of the propertv transferred. Had the $1
million fair market value of the property been used as the investment
in the contract the exclusion ratio woula have been four times greater
than the exclusion ratio which results from using the $250,000 adjusted
basis.
(3) Since the property the taxpayer transferred in exchange for the
annuity had appreciated in value, the difference between the basis of
the property, $250,000, and the present fair market value of the con-
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sideration received, $757,630, is realized gain of $507,630. Under the
Ruling, this gain can be spread over the 13.8 life expectancy of the taxpayer, computed according to the life expectancy tables used to determine the expected return on the contract for Section 72 purposes.
The question has been raised from time to time whether Revenue
Ruling 69-74 is entirely correct in its treatment of the tax consequences
of private annuities. Revenue Ruling 69-74 does represent a departure
by the Service from its previous Ruling under the 1939 Code equivalent
of Section 72. Under Revenue Ruling 239, issued in 1953, the Service
took the position that the investment in the contract was the fair market
value of the property transferred, even when appreciated property was
used to purchase the annuity. Thus the ordinary income portion of the
annuity, determined by applying a fixed 3 percent rate of return to the
investment in the contract, was measured by the value of the property,
and not the basis of the property. That ruling also held that the open
transaction concept of Burnet v. Logan applied, in part, to the sale of
property in return for an annuity promise, which meant that the other
97 percent of the annuity payments first represented a return of
basis in the property transferred and thereafter were capital gain until
the fair market value of the property at the time of transfer was fully
recovered. Thereafter the entire annuity payments were taxed as
ordinary income. Revenue Ruling 69-74 was a major departure from
this treatment of private annuities in two important respects. First,
it reduced the investment in the contract from the value of the property
to its basis. Second, it required that the gain inherent in the transferred
property be recognized ratably over the period of the life expectancy
of the annuitant rather than recognized only after the basis of the property had been fully recovered. Prior to the promulgation of Revenue
Ruling 69-74, an unsuccessful attempt had been made to add a
Section 1241 to the 1954 Code at the time that the 1954 Code was
adopted, the effect of which would have been to close an annuity
transaction such as this at the time of the transfer, causing the entire
amount of the gain on the transfer to be recognized immediately. The
legislative history conclusively shows that Congress, in rejecting the
adoption of that section, considered that such treatment would be a
dramatic departure from existing law, presumably referring to Revenue
Ruling 239. It is interesting to note that as late as 1963, the Service was
unsuccessfully attempting to secure legislation effecting a compromise
between the open and closed transaction treatment of gain by means of
the technique they eventually followed in Revenue Ruling 69-74. The
Service's present position, reflected in Revenue Ruling 69-74, that the
investment in the contract is the basis of the property and not its fair
market value, is inconsistent with Treasury Regulations Section
1.1011-2(c), Example 8, which was adopted in October of 1972, three
years after the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 69-74. This Regulation
provides that, in the case of the transfer of property to a charitable
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beneficiary in return for a life annuity, the investment in the contract,
under Section 72, is the fair market value of the property, rather than
its adjusted basis.
Although there is substantial opinion that Revenue Ruling 69-74 is
incorrect in measuring the investment in the contract by basis rather
than fair market value of the transferred property, no litigation has
tested this aspect of the Ruling in an unsecured private annuity situation,
although language in 212 Corporation seems to suggest fair market
value is the proper measure.
The leading case dealing with Revenue Ruling 69-74 and its effect
on the private annuity transaction area is Estate of Lloyd Bell. In the
Bell case, the Tax Court essentially adopted the rationale of the ruling,
except that it held that the entire amount of the gain realized on the
transfer of appreciated property in return for a private annuity should
be recognized at the time of the transaction. Thus, with respect to recognition of gain, it adopted the approach of the unsuccessfully proposed
Section 1241. Arguably, the basis for the Tax Court's departure in
this decision from Revenue Ruling 69-74 was that the private annuity in
question was fully secured by the property transferred whereas the annuity in revenue Ruling 69-74 was unsecured. The Bell approach was
followed in a recent case, 212 Corporation v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
No. 77, which also involved a fully secured annuity promise.
In Fehrs Finance Company v. Comm'ssioner, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed and accepted the reasoning of the Tax Court, which distinguished the Bell case and held that a transfer of property in return
for an unsecured private annuity did not cause the entire realized
gain to be recognized in the year of transfer. However, it is not clear
from that opinion whether Revenue Ruling 69-74 which spreads the
gain ratably over the life expectancy of the annuitant, or whether
the open transaction doctrine which defers the gain until the full basis
has been recovered, was considered the proper approach. The Court
merely noted that the gain did not have to be reported in the year
of the transfer due to the uncertainty of payment. However, by citing
two earlier decisions, J. Darsie Lloyd and Commissioner v. Kahn's
Estate, both of which had applied the open transaction doctrine, the
Eighth Circuit seems to have reaffirmed the open transaction doctrine
and rejected the position taken in Revenue Ruling 69-74.
Consequently, although the private annuity purchased with appreciated property offers potentially large advantages for income, estate
and gift tax purposes, the present unsettled state of the law in this
area, as a result of Revenue Ruling 69-74 and the Bell case, limits the
desirability of using this device.
An interesting issue related to the question of when the gain on the
transaction is to be recognized if it is not recognized entirely in the
year of the transfer, is what happens if the annuitant, who has transferred
the appreciated property, dies before the entire realized gain has been
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recognized. Neither Revenue Ruling 69-74 nor the cases deal with
this question. If our taxpayer transferred his property worth $1 million
to his two sons in return for a life annuity of $100,000 a year and
then died four years later having received $400,000 in total annuity
payments, the entire balance of the gain would never be recognized
under either the open transaction doctrine or the ratable recovery rule
of Revenue Ruling 69-74. The net effect would be that he would have
effectively transferred property worth $1 million, paid at the outset
a gift tax on approximately $240,000, and totally avoided tax on a
substantial portion of the gain. However, the benefit of this avoidance of
the gain may be mitigated somewhat by the Service's approach to the
basis of the property in the hands of the transferee (the obligor on
the annuity) in Revenue Ruling 55-119. According to this Ruling, the
transferee would receive a lower basis, reflective of the amount actually
paid on the annuity, which would cause the unrecognized gain to be
taxed eventually to the transferee when he makes a disposition of the
property.
The second intra-family transfer to be considered is the installment
sale, the income tax consequences of which are governed by Section
453. Section 453 permits the taxpayer to elect to spread the gain realized
on the disposition of certain kinds of property over the period of the
installment payments, rather than having the full realized gain taxed
in the year of the sale. In our hypothetical situation, the use of a Section
453 installment election offers several distinct tax benefits. It permits the
present transfer of the assets for full consideration, thereby eliminating
any possibility that the asset itself will be included in the estate of the
transferor, even if he dies within three years of the date of the transfer.
It also keeps the asset within the family group while permitting the original owner to liquidate his investment to obtain retirement funds or
funds to be expended during the transferor's lifetime for any other
purpose. It provides the transferee with a stepped-up basis equal to
the full purchase price, but does not require that the transferee pay
the full purchase price immediately. Instead, the installment sale permits
the purchase price to be funded by future income from the property
itself, if it is income producing property. Of course, one of the major
advantages, from an income and estate tax savings perspective, is
that both the future income and the future appreciation in value of the
property are shifted from the transferor who is likely to be in a relatively
high income tax bracket to the transferee who is likely to be in a
relatively low income tax bracket.
An important concern with installment sales of property is the
need to structure the transaction in such a way that it will clearly
qualify as an installment sale under Section 453. Obviously, if the stock
is to be sold directly to another family member, no particular problems would exist in qualifying for an installment sale, although the
transferor would then have to rely on the family member's ability to
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pay the installments. However, one situation where this can be a
problem is when the asset to be disposed of is stock, when that stock is
to be redeemed by the corporation or the corporation is to be liquidated.
This would commonly occur when an individual who is a principal in
a family corporation is about to retire and his interest is to be liquidated
so that control of the corporation can pass to other family members.
With a stock redemption or liquidation, however, there is no possibility
of electing Section 453 treatment because the redemption or liquidation
will not create installment payments. To qualify for a redemption or
liquidation, and at the same time obtain the benefit of the installment
gain reporting election, attempts have been made to interpose an artificial intermediary between the original owner of the property and the
corporation. A successful example of this is found in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in the Rushing case in which the two shareholders of a corporation decided to sell all the assets of the corporation and then to
liquidate it. Because a sale of all of the assets followed by a complete
liquidation of the corporation would result in capital gains to the
two shareholders which could not be deferred on the installment basis,
they created two irrevocable trusts just before the end of the 12-month
sale period of Section 337 and sold their stock to these trusts on the installment basis. The independent trustee of these trusts paid for the stock
with a small down payment and secured the payment of future installments by the trusts assets, including the stock. Then the trustee, as
the sole shareholder, completed the liquidation of the corporation without, of course, having to recognize additional gain. The Service attempted to argue that the effect of the transaction was a liquidation
by the two individual shareholders followed by their contribution of the
net proceeds to the trusts. Under this approach, the shareholders would
each have been forced to recognize one-half of the total gain in the
year of the sale. The Fifth Circuit upheld the installment gain election
because the corporate trustee was totally independent, and, therefore,
the two individual taxpayers did not have any control over the proceeds
of the liquidation or the decision whether or not to liquidate, nor did
they receive any direct economic benefit from the proceeds of the
liquidation.
Although, on the authority of Rushing, the use of this kind of device
for the purpose of obtaining installment sale treatment should be successful, a number of decisions in a related area involving the interposition of an installment sale to a charitable organization between the
seller and the ultimate purchaser who is unwilling to buy on an installment basis in which the Courts have reached the opposite conclusion, and the Service's announcement in Revenue Ruling 73-157
that it considered the Rushing decision to be incorrect, have caused
use of the installment sale for intra-family transfers to often be limited
to only the direct transfer situations. However, the Tax Court's recent
decision in William D. Pityo, which reaffirmed the Rushing decision, has
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renewed interest in use of an intermediary to structure an installment
transaction where the intermediary otherwise would not be necessary.
Although it did not deal with the liquidation of a corporation, the
essential facts of the transaction in Pityo were otherwise very similar
to the facts in Rushing. The taxpayer owned a substantial block of
publicly traded stock, which represented over 90 percent of his total
wealth. To overcome a serious liquidity problem and, at the same time,
to minimize his immediate income tax liability for the capital gains
which would be realized on the sale of the stock, the taxpayer created
several irrevocable trusts with other property and named a bank as
trustee of all of them. He then sold his stock to the trusts in return for
long-term installment notes. The trustee almost immediately thereafter
sold a substantial block of the stock outright. Mr. Pityo elected Section
453 treatment for his sale to the trust. The Service disallowed that
election on the ground that the trustee's sale of the stock shortly after
Mr. Pityo's transfer to the trust should be attributed to Mr. Pityo. If the
trustee's sale of the stock were attributed to him, then the proceeds he
would have been treated as having received in the year of the transaction, including the trust's sale proceeds, would have exceeded 30
percent of the installment sale price and barred a Section 453 election.
Applying the Rushing rationale, the Court concluded that the taxpayer
had neither control over, nor received economic benefit from, the sale
of the stock by the trustee. Again, major emphasis was placed on the
trustee's independence in deciding whether or not to sell the stock and
how the sale proceeds should be used.
There is still some uncertainty about when the courts would recognize that a true Rushing-type situation had been created rather than
a "sham" intermediary set up merely for the purpose of qualifying
the sale for installment treatment. In both Rushing and Pityo, it was
considered important that the trusts had some assets prior to its
entering into the installment sale, other than those sold it on an installment basis. Obviously, serious consideration should be given to
structuring a Rushing-type installment sale transaction in an appropriate
case, particularly if the taxpayer resides within the jurisdiction of the
Fifth Circuit.
Comparing an installment sale with a transfer in exchange for a
private annuity, the installment sale has a similar economic effect to
a sale for a joint and survivor annuity, although it eliminates the
potential immediate recognition of gain that could result from use of
the private annuity transaction under the rationale of Bell's Estate and
212 Corporation, at least where the annuity is secured by the property
transferred. Securing the installment sale notes by the property transferred does not defeat the installment election. On the other hand,
the estate tax advantages of the private annuity may be greater than
those than can be obtained by use of the installment sale. While nothing
would be included in the estate of the annuitant if there is no survivor
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annuity and if the annuity payments have been spent as they have
been received, the present value of the right to receive future installments is an asset in the estate of the installment transferor and the
actual post-death installment payments would be income in respect
of a decedent.
Something that has been seldom tried but has been successful has
been to combine the income tax benefits of the installment sale with
the estate tax benefits of the private annuity. This is done by structuring
a proper installment sale which qualifies for Section 453 treatment and
then providing that any installments remaining due at the death of
the transferor are to be forgiven, as in Ruby Louise Cain, 37 T.C. 185
(1961), acq. 1962-2 C.B. 4. The transferor receives the estate tax benefit of a private life annuity because nothing is included in his estate if he
dies before all payments are made. Yet he avoids the confusion that
currently exists with regard to the income tax consequences of the
private annuity transaction. This kind of transaction apparently provides
the best of both worlds-something that always makes tax lawyers
nervous! It should be noted that the Cain case did not deal with the
potential problem that the "forgiveness of payments which would be
owned after death" could cause price itself for sale to be uncertain.
The third and final intrafamily transfer method to be considered
is the one which seems to be generating the most current litigation:
the transfer-leaseback transaction. A transfer of property followed by
a leaseback of that same property to the transferor is designed almost
entirely to take advantage of potential income tax savings. The income
tax benefit intended to be accomplished is the diversion of a portion
of the transferor's income to the transferee, who is usually in a lower
income tax bracket.
This diversion is accomplished by an income tax rental deduction
under Section 162(a) (3), which allows a business deduction for rental
payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or
possession of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not
taking title or in which he has no equity. The current transfer-leaseback
controversy revolves around the leaseback of property used in his
trade or business to the transferor after he has transferred that property
either to a trust established primarily to receive it or to another family
member. The Service has attacked these transfer-leaseback transactions
as shams motivated entirely by tax avoidance and has sought to disallow
the deduction for rent on a variety of theories. When the Service has
been successful in having the rent deduction disallowed, the continuing
payments required under the lease could be treated as a series of gifts
to the transferee. Disallowance of the rent deduction would have no
effect on the original transfer which, if it had been by gift may have
caused gift tax, and if it had been by sale, may have caused income
tax on the recognized gain. If, in our hypothetical situation, the land
and building are transferred to the taxpayer's sons by gift, the taxpayer
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would incur substantial gift taxes of roughly $200,000 assuming that
there had been no prior gifts and no gift splitting-election. I am
also assuming, somewhat unrealistically, that he is willing to transfer
such a major asset and incur a large gift tax now. If the land and
building were sold to the sons either outright, through financing arranged
by the sons who would use the property as collateral, or through an
installment sale, a gain of $600,000 will be recognized by our taxpayer.
Then, if the lease is entered into with the sons at the assumed fair
rental value of $5,000 a month, our taxpayer would obtain an income
tax deduction of $60,000 a year which would shelter other income and
reduce his tax liability proportionately, depending upon his marginal
income tax rate. Assuming his sons are in a lower effective rate bracket,
overall family tax savings will result from diverting $60,000 of income
to them annually. However, if the deduction is disallowed, the gift
tax or the capital gains tax will have been incurred and cannot be
undone and the $60,000 annual payments will continue to go to the
sons during the period of the lease and would be treated either as income
to them, although the taxpayer would receive no deduction, or more
likely, as additional gifts from the taxpayer. If the transaction were
then reversed by reconveyance to the taxpayer, the sons would each
incur gift tax if the retransfer were by gift. If the retransfer were accomplished by sale, no additional tax should result unless the property
had increased in value between the time when the sons received it and
retransferred it. Although the transfer-leaseback arrangement has been
used by taxpayers for a considerable period of time, the current controversy over these transactions can be traced to the 1948 decision
in Skemp v. Commissioner, which was quickly followed by Brown v.
Commissioner. In each of these cases a doctor-transferor placed his
medical building in an irrevocable trust for a fixed term and simultaneously executed a lease with the trustee, the terms of which were substantially similar to the relevent terms of the trust. The Service disallowed
the rent deduction on the ground that the rent was not "required",
but in each case, the Service's position was reversed on the basis that
the transferor was legally bound by the lease agreement to make the
rent payments and the independent trustee was legally bound to collect
those payments, despite the voluntary creation of both the trust and
the rental obligation. However, in Van Zandt v. Commissioner, the
Fifth Circuit later refused to allow the rent deduction when a doctor
had created a Clifford Trust for a term of ten years and two months,
named himself as trustee, retained a reversion in the property and set
up the lease arrangement in such a way that, as trustee, he had no
function other than to collect the rent for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. The Court concluded that there was no business purpose for the
transaction as a whole and that the transaction was structured solely because of tax avoidance motives and therefore, it disallowed the claimed
rent deduction. Immediately following the Van Zandt decision, a
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rent deduction was allowed in Alden B. Oakes where an independent
trustee was named in a transfer-leaseback transaction otherwise very
similar to the transaction in Van Zandt.
Following these cases, the two crucial factors which the courts considered in determining the validity of rent deductions following a
transfer-leaseback were the independence of the transferee and the
existence of a reversionary interest in the transferor. More recently,
however, as a result of Perry v. U.S. in which the Fourth Circuit refused
to allow a rent deduction to a doctor who had transferred his medical
building to a bank as trustee of a Clifford Trust in which the transferor
had retained a reversionary interest, the critical factors have become less
clear. The disallowance of the rent deduction in Perry was based solely
on the ground that no business purpose had been shown for the entire
transaction. According to the Fourth Circuit, the independence of the
trustee was not crucial, because the entire transaction lacked business
purpose. The Court did not specifically consider whether the existence
of a reversion in the transferor was itself a prohibited "equity" in the
transferred property, which would also have required disallowance of the
rent deduction. Then, in the Matthews case, the Fifth Circuit disallowed
a rent deduction, in a situation similar to Perry, on the somewhat different ground that the transaction, as a whole, lacked "economic reality".
It would appear that "economic reality" and "business purpose" are
phrases describing essentially the same test. However, a "business purpose" without "economic reality" will not satisfy the Matthews standard. The Fifth Circuit in Matthews also noted that independence of the
trustee could not, by itself, supply "economic reality".
As a result of the Perry and Matthews decisions, the general guidelines
that had been relied upon in the transfer-leaseback area, particularly
where a trust is used, have become less definite. A business purpose
for the lease itself and independence of the trustee, previously thought
to be the crucial factors, have definitely become less important and,
at least in the Fifth Circuit, probably nothing more than threshold considerations. The economic reality of the transaction or the business
purpose for the entire transaction, which are apparently the important
factors now, are virtually impossible to define with any degree of
precision. Finally, it is not clear whether a reversionary interest in the
transferor will disqualify the rent deduction because the transferor
has retained an equity interest in the transferred property.
The decisions since Perry and Matthews have done very little to
clear up the confusion in this area. Thus, for example, in Richard A.
Serbousek, the Tax Court rejected the Service's attempt to apply the
Matthews "economic reality" test to the transfer of a medical building
by two doctors to an independent trustee of a trust in which they did
not retain any reversionary interest. The medical building was leased
back on the day following the transfer in a "negotiated" lease with
the trustee. Rather than follow the appellate decision in Matthews,
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the Tax Court turned to its own Matthews decision, which had set out
four tests the Tax Court considered determinative on the issue of the
bona fides of the lease agreement. Those tests were: (1) whether
the transferor had retained substantially the same control over the property after the transfer as before the transfer, a test which is easily satisfied, if a trust is used, by the independence of the trustee and the fact
that the trustee has fiduciary duties; (2) whether the leaseback was in
writing and required a reasonable rental, a requirement has been met
in virtually every transfer-leaseback case; (3) whether the leaseback
itself had a business purpose, as distinguished from whether there was
a business purpose for the entire transaction, a test which is nearly
always satisfied by the fact that the property transferred is an integral
part of the business of the transferor; and (4) whether the taxpayer
had a disqualifying equity in the transferred property. Considering
the Serbousek case in light of these requirements, the Tax Court upheld
the claimed rental deduction on facts virtually identical to those presented in Matthews. Again in Richard R. Quinlivan, the Tax Court
applied the four tests set out in its own Matthews decision and upheld
a rental deduction. In particular the Court again concluded that the business purpose test was satisfied if there was a business purpose for the
lease itself without regard to whether there was a business purpose for
the transfer-leaseback transaction as a whole. The most interesting aspect
of Quinlivan, and one which has generally been overlooked, relates
to the Court's handling of the transferor's reversionary interest in the
trust in light of the fourth factor: whether the taxpayer has a disqualifying equity interest. On this issue, the Court made the following cryptic
comment:
With respect to the fourth requirement in Matthews we cannot agree with respondent's contention that petitioners possessed an equitable interest or "equity" in the realty within the
meaning of section 162(a)(3). Briefly stated, petitioners'
reversionary interest was not derived from the lease or the
lessor and would only become possessory after the termination of the trusts. Therefore, such interest is not within the
prohibition of section 162(a) (3).
The recent Supreme Court decision in Frank Lyon Company v. U.S.,
has not by itself had any clear effect on the intra-family transfer-leaseback area. Lyon involved a three party commercial transfer-leaseback.
The Court upheld the leaseback arrangement in view of the independence
of the parties involved, the assumption of the risk by the taxpayer holding the property, and the substantial business reasons for the transaction,
concluding that the transaction was consistent with objective economic
realities, a statement reminiscent of the Fifth Circuit decision in
Matthews. However, the Court went on to note that, if the lessor
retains "significant and genuine attributes of a lessor, then the lease
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form will govern for tax purposes". Since Lyon dealt with a commercial
transaction and was clearly not based on the intra-family transferleaseback cases, its effect on that area is uncertain. Two subsequent
decisions, both of which involve commercial, non-family transactions,
have been of no further help. In Preston W. Carroll, the Court relied
on the economic reality test of the Fifth Circuit and expressly distinguished the intra-family transfer-leaseback cases as inapplicable to a
commercial leaseback transaction. In T. Wayne Davis, the Court again
found economic reality in a lease arrangement between related corporations in a case very similar to the facts of Lyon, without making any
reference to the intra-family transfer-leaseback area.
Undoubtedly, the intra-family transfer-leaseback area will at some
point be considered by the Supreme Court in order to resolve the
somewhat conflicting views of the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit, and
the Fourth Circuit. In the meantime, the decision whether to use a
transfer-leaseback and if so, how best to structure the transaction for
minimum tax exposure must continue to be made by tax planners. At
a minimum, the four Tax Court Matthews factors should be met. This
would require that there be a business purpose for the lease, an independent trustee or other transferee, an attempt to set a fair rental
value in the written lease and no retention of any interest in the property
by the transferor. In addition, the lease portion of the transaction
should not be prearranged and must be negotiated after the transfer.
CONCLUSION

The uncertainties with regard to the tax consequences of all three
of these arrangements (the private annuity, the installment sale, and the
transfer-leaseback) raise the question why anyone would attempt to use
one of these transactions or recommend its use by a client. However,
there is sufficient guidance from the cases that have been decided with
regard to all of these kinds of transactions to at least anticipate the
maximum tax exposure, weigh the substantial benefits that may be
gained by use of one or more of these transactions, and determine
whether the risks involved are worth it for your particular client. Until
such time as the law in these three areas becomes more certain, however, we should not be overquick to counsel a client to utilize these
devices.

